ism ; but the mood of the moment is often not lenient.
THE MOOD OF REJECTION
In addition there are broader reasons for the common charge that modernization is the political ideology of Western self-interest, de- fensive and conservative. In some respects the drumbeats of modernization just a decade old now echo as strangely out of date. Although the definitions of modernization vary considerably, they agree in an emphasis on man's increasing control of his environment (Hagen, 1962: 7; Black, 1966; Organski, 1965: 7) . For economists, the tempation is simply to look at those relatively objective conditions that allow greater productivity (Uphoff and Ilchman, 1972: 77-108) . But many today-in the prosperous countries, to be sure-distrust productivity; and for those worried about nuclear war and pollution, talk of our control of nature is ironic at best. Maybe modernization, the kinder critics suggest, does not speak to current values, to a world concerned about limited resources and the autonomous role of international corporations.
The mood of antipathy toward growth (or development), modernity (or modernization), or theories about them contains a strong distrust of cold rationality, whereas the theories distrusted have been put forward by those who would make the social sciences the &dquo;sober trustee&dquo; (the phrase is Almond and Powell's, Service, 1960: 5ff.). &dquo;Far from being a universally applicable schema for the study of the development of human societies, the nature of modernization theory reflects a particular phase in the development of a single society, that of the United States&dquo; (Tipps, 1973: 211). Concepts antiseptically scientific that are discovered to carry the bacteria of values; development &dquo;involves, for those who propose it as for those to whom it is proposed, central value choices about the meaning of life&dquo; (Goulet, 1973: 301 (Eisenstadt, 1973: 109) has not been much clarified by debate or brave efforts to distinguish &dquo;modernization&dquo; from &dquo;development,&dquo; itself &dquo;one of the most deprecated terms in social science literature, having been used vastly more than it has been understood&dquo; (Uphoff and Ilchman, 1972: ix (Bendix, 1967: 292) , but antimodernist sentiment has in the decade since he wrote brought forth associations quite contrary to those once dominant. Cyril Black (1966: 7-8) (Tipps, 1973; Holt and Turner, 1966: 12-50; Horowitz, 1966: 397-426; Tilly, 1975: 601-638 Bendix (1967: 295, 313-320) considers the contrast &dquo;invidious.&dquo; Within the pair, tradition is the insidious, misleading term. Modernization, it is often pointed out, is not the same as modernity (Bendix, 1967: (Shorter, 1975: 21) (Eisenstadt, 1973: 13, 99-103, 119-120; Braibanti and Spengler, 1961; Hoselitz and Moore, 1963: 83-114 (Shils, 1960: 144-145, 154) . Logic adds that &dquo;non-innovational&dquo; responses can be &dquo;progressive&dquo; just as traditional behavior is a part of bureaucratic (modern) societies (Sklair, 1970: (Deutsch, 1966: 49 Tilly, 1975) Finally, historians will do well to jettison that aspect of modernization called convergence theory, the assumption that modernizing societies became more alike. A tempting extension of the model, it is not the logical next step it seems to be, with its implications of total social transformations and technological determinism (see the searing critiques of Weinberg, 1969, and Skinner, 1976 (Lerner, 1958 (Wallerstein, 1974a (Wallerstein, , 1974b . So broad a canvas fits modernization well. The world, says Eisenstadt, is the &dquo;cardinal category&dquo; of social science; when the world is the system, all nations are developing-also backward (Eisenstadt, 1973: 107) . Like the neo-Marxist analysis on which it [300] builds (see Frank, 1969 Frank, , 1975  (Smith, 1971: 86-150) (Qadeer, 1974: 283 (Tilly, 1975: 619-620) .
No wonder Tipps has told us to abandon modernization (Tipps, 1973: 223 In the last two centuries, something similar has happened to most of the world-in technology obviously, through economics clearly, but also in politics and social organization. Perhaps no evidence makes the point so clearly as the demographic revolutions that have swept the world, slightly different in each case, rarely simultaneous, but with common patterns that are inescapable (Vinovskis, 1976: 81-85) . These large-scale changes that put people in schools and change their diets, [302] redefine work, amass new wealth and power, and alter the organizations through which all this is structured while maintaining surprising continuity-this whole complex process deserves a name and modernization springs to mind. A well-known report on history and the social sciences sees three major concerns of social-scientific history: collective behavior, theoretical concepts and models, and extensive comparison (Landes and Tilly, 1971: 71-73) . In turning to modernization historians should make contributions through all three approaches. Despite well-founded criticism, even those skeptical of mechanical applications of the concept still expect to find it useful for a wide range of questions from new work on the family (Hareven, 1976: 203-204) to discriminating among forms of fascism 131-133).
MODERNIZATION AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES &dquo;Man is not a captive of history &dquo; (Black, 1966: 157) . From the standpoint of the other social sciences much the same can be said. Few subjects have brought these disciplines to such borrowings and coopera- [304] tion. A close sampling of the enormous literature on the subject will incidentally show that many of the errors attributed to modernization theory were effectively avoided by the ablest scholars all along. More important, it will show an extraordinary awareness of each other's work. The debates within each discipline-on evolution, capital, diffusion, community, center and periphery, class conflict, institutions, markets, religion, and elites-have in the context of modernization flowed across disciplines. This gives much of the writing on modernization something of the dull refinement of a faculty club as scholars endlessly cite each other; but it also offers hope of that cumulative quality that is a mark of science, a quality which requires that we &dquo;link our efforts to the mainstream of social and historical thought&dquo; (Goody, 1976: 41 (Burrow, 1966; Goody, 1976: 1-2; Almond and Powell, 1966: 1-8 (Easton, 1965: 483-484) . Suspect evolutionism has been so closely associated with the aspiration for a science of society that it may be wiser to tame it through a sophisticated view of modernization (which even in its simplest forms rarely comes close to proposing unilinear evolution and which in principle at least allows for &dquo;negative or regressive&dquo; development) [Almond and Powell, 1966: 34-35] (Tipps, 1973: 202, 224 (Black, 1966:61 (LaPalombara, 1969: 1254, 1259). The evolution observed will be &dquo;specific evolution&dquo; rather than &dquo;general,&dquo; and there will be no difficulty in acknowledging that &dquo;adaptive improvement is relative to the adaptive problem&dquo; (Sahlins and Service, 1960: 15, 26, 43-4.4) . Nor is this adaptation to be confused with progress, for it includes responses like Hagen's (1962: 197, 216, 415-416, 500-501) [308]
Current work on social indicators and the growing data banks of historical statistics should also be prominent in future work on modernization. Skillful use of aggregate data-on population, migration, urbanization, education, public services, housing, wages, arrests and convictions-can provide the sort of overall measures of change that economists and students of voting behavior have long exploited. As always, specific problems will call for particular methods; quantification, model-building, and archival research will, if our central questions are good and our hypotheses carefully posed, all make their contributions (Wallerstein, 1974b: 415 
